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Conspiracy theories (CTs) can take many forms and vary widely in popularity, the intensity
with which they are believed and their effects on individual and collective behavior. An
integrated account of CTs thus needs to explain how they come to appeal to potential
believers, how they spread from one person to the next via communication, and how they
motivate collective action.We summarize these aspects under the labels of stick, spread,
and action.Wepropose the quasi-religious hypothesis for CTs: drawing on cognitive science
of religion, social representations theory, and frame theory. We use cognitive science of
religion to describe the main features of the content of CTs that explain how they come
to stick: CTs are quasi-religious representations in that their contents, forms and functions
parallel those found in beliefs of institutionalized religions. However, CTs are quasi-religious
in that CTs and the communities that support them, lack many of the institutional features
of organized religions.We use social representations theory to explain how CTs spread as
devices for making sense of sudden events that threaten existing worldviews. CTs allow
laypersons to interpret such events by relating them to common sense, thereby defusing
some of the anxiety that those events generate.We use frame theory to explain how some,
but not all CTs mobilize collective counter-conspiratorial action by identifying a target and
by proposing credible and concrete rationales for action.We specify our integrated account
in 13 propositions.
Keywords: quasi-religion, social representations, frame theory, conspiracy theory, minimal counter-intuitiveness,
sense making, beliefs
INTRODUCTION
Conspiracies are a fact of history, so much that Machiavelli
(1532/1961) wrote a famous practical guide on how to conspire
successfully against an illegitimate government. However, conspir-
acy theories (CTs) are often independent from the base rate of real
conspiracies (Bale, 2007). CTs may over-generalize a cognitive and
social possibility out of proportion, seeing agencywhere theremay
be little more than randomness, “cock-up” or structural dynamics
which nobody in particular designed.
However, our present purpose is not to debunk yet another
CT, but to theoretically elucidate their dynamics and inner logic.
Like Freud (1914) considered slips of the tongue as openings to
the unconscious mind, Norman (1981) presented action slips as
markers of the organization of memory, and Reason (1990) uses
errors to gain insights into skilled performance, we consider CTs
as occasions to elucidate actual representations of reality as part
of human social functioning. Understanding CTs in turn helps us
understand the potentially high human costs of over-generalizing
agency. Though we need to guard ourselves against creating a
conspiracy theory of CTs, our working hypothesis is that CTs have
a degree of functional autonomy in modern societies which needs
to be understood.
Conspiracy theories have many facets. On the one hand, they
constitute cognitive resources that fulﬁll a need to explain unusual,
disturbing events such as disease outbreak, disruptive technology,
major scandal, or sudden celebrity death (McCauley and Jacques,
1979; Wagner-Egger et al., 2011). On the other hand, they are
narratives that circulate in culture – in mass media, as rumors,
in stories (Byford, 2011). These narratives reduce the complexity
presented by such events, contain the uncertainty they generate,
and translate unspeciﬁc anxiety into focused fears (Barrett and
Lawson, 2001). CT narratives are also inscribed in the context
of antagonistic relations between groups, drawing on recurrent
negative views of outgroups to explain events and, sometimes,
motivate collective action.
The interplay between psychological and socio-cultural func-
tions of CTs is arguably best understood in interdisciplinary
terms. CTs have attracted research in pockets of social science and
humanities like cultural studies (Parish and Parker, 2001), psycho-
analysis (Zonis and Joseph, 1994), political science (Hofstadter,
1965), history (Roberts, 1972), philosophy (Keeley, 1999), and
psychology (Swami et al., 2011). Whilst insightful, such research
has investigated CTs from within a discipline, focusing either on
symbolic aspects (e.g., rhetoric, discourse, narratives; Billig, 1987)
or on psychological phenomena (cognitive biases and errors, indi-
vidual differences, psychopathology), but there have been few
attempts at integration – leaving a more general theory of CTs
lacking.
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It is difﬁcult to explain the set of dimensions along which CTs
vary from within speciﬁc disciplines. One dimension concerns the
intensity of belief in the CT, which ranges from casual to pas-
sionate. More casual CTs (e.g., the “X-Files”), can be engaged
with similar to any kind of ﬁction, suspending disbelief whilst
being entertained (Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009). But other CTs
are believed quite passionately, and are used to frame events in
radical ways so as to mobilize collective action against a target
(the conspiratorial agent). An example is the CT propagated dur-
ing the Black Death accusing Jews of plotting against Christianity.
This CT motivated Christian inhabitants of European cities to
numerous pogroms, leading to the eradication of Jewish commu-
nities in Western Europe (Kelly, 2005). A second dimension of
CTs is their distribution. Some CTs arise in a small community
and are not widely accepted in society (e.g., the belief that power-
ful leaders of this planet are members of a race of lizards seeking
world domination), while others are held by a majority of the
population (e.g., the belief that the Kennedy assassination was not
the work of a lone gunman; Goertzel, 1994). A third dimension
along which CTs vary is their connection with collective action –
some being conﬁned to collective sense-making, whilst others
(as in the pogroms) lead to collective action against the alleged
conspirators.
The variety of CTs along the three dimensions of belief
intensity, distribution and action (more could be distinguished)
thus poses a challenge to any erstwhile account of this genre.
We summarize these aspects under the labels of stick, spread,
and action, and propose an account of CTs that explains
them by drawing on three theoretical approaches: the cogni-
tive science of religion, social representations theory, and frame
theory.
We propose the quasi-religious hypothesis for CTs: CTs are
quasi-religious representations, in that their contents, forms, and
functions parallel those found in beliefs supported by institution-
alized religions, though CTs lack certain features of organized
religions. Being quasi-religious offers an explanation of CTs’ ubiq-
uity, especially in postindustrial secular societies. But CTs appeal
especially to constituencies who are averse to the strictures of
organized religions or established political orthodoxies. CTs have
a subversive ﬂavor that contradicts ofﬁcial accounts of events,
be they secular or religious. This feature is difﬁcult to explain
via cognitive science, but is a primary focus of social represen-
tations theory. Social representations theory explains how CTs
enable laypersons to make sense of complex, ambiguous situa-
tions, howCTs spread, andhow theymay changeduring spreading.
However, social representations theory does not focus primar-
ily on how representations get used by social groups to achieve
political ends, and so we invoke frame theory to deal with this
aspect.
We review relevant aspects of cognitive science of religion,
social representations theory, and frame theory, applying them
to the analysis of CT features. This generates a set of propositions
about CTs that can be used to develop further empirical inves-
tigations. In what follows, we use speciﬁc terminology: CTs are
propagated by sponsors who seek to spread sticky representations
of events to a larger audience, often with the intent to frame them
into action.
EXPLAINING CT STICKINESS: COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF
RELIGION
Our key claim is that CTs have contents and functions that are
quasi-religious: there is an analogy between religious beliefs and
some of the ways in which CTs typically construe the issue and the
conspirators. There is, however, no predicted homology between
CTs and religious beliefs – they are not identical in content, struc-
ture or function, nor is there any predicted relation between
religiosity – the tendency to hold religious beliefs – and the ten-
dency to hold CTs. Indeed, the value of a scientiﬁc analogy is partly
in the ways in which the two domains match and partly in the way
in which they do not; as we note below, both may be empirically
informative.
RELIGION, COGNITIVE SCIENCE, AND ANTHROPOLOGY
Cognitive science and cognitive anthropology of religion treat
supernatural beliefs as natural, in that they have the same founda-
tion as beliefs about the natural and social world (e.g., Boyer, 2001;
Boyer and Ramble, 2001; see also Pyysiäinen, 2001; Atran and
Norenzayan, 2004). However, instead of simply instantiating all
intuitive beliefs, religious beliefs are“minimally counter-intuitive,”
in denying or violating a few intuitive qualities – for example, a
representation of a “spirit” is founded on commonsense represen-
tations about people (e.g., people have agency, act according to
beliefs and desires, have memories), but denies qualities concern-
ing their physical and biological nature. This minimal biological
counter-intuitiveness then enables the belief in further qualities
of spirits (e.g., their longevity, ability to pass through physical
objects). By building on everyday representations of the natu-
ral and social world, religious representations therefore draw on
explanatory resources used in everyday life: the supernatural builds
on the natural.
Three additional qualities of religious representations are per-
tinent to CTs. How those representations are held in mind (i.e.,
how they are believed), the speciﬁc contents that are represented
(i.e., what is believed), and why other peoples’ beliefs should
matter to us. Concerning how they are believed, Sperber (1975,
1996) has argued that some religious representations involvemeta-
representations: paradoxical representations that are not fully
interpreted, in comparison to the non-religious representations
on which they are based – there is always a kernel of doubt at their
core, arising from their empirical indeterminacy (Franks, 2003).
For example, Catholic mass involves ingesting a solid and a liquid
that are simultaneously bread andwine and the body and the blood
of Christ. Whereas representations of bread, wine, the body and
the blood of Christ are easily understood as solids and liquids, the
meta-representation of the two solids as identical, and the two liq-
uids as identical, remains a mystery. Sperber (1975, 1996) suggests
that the identiﬁcation is held in mental quotes, and is not fully
processed. Adherents are not expected to fully understand such
a representation to the degree that they would understand ordi-
nary representations; rather, they defer to the expert knowledge
of priests. Complex, mysterious and potentially threatening ideas
can be explained, if not by the adherents themselves. Deference to
experts is, therefore, often built into religious beliefs.
Regarding content of religious beliefs, representations of super-
natural agents often involve denying human physical qualities but
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retaining or exaggerating psychological ones. In particular, they
tend to interpret situations or events via the activity of sentient
agents rather than situational factors. This may reﬂect an evolved
disposition to see agency where there is none (Guthrie, 1980,
1993); such “hyperactive” agency detection would lead people to
make more false positive judgements than false negative judge-
ments regarding whether, for example, a surprising sound like a
snapping twig was caused by a predator or a harmless event. It
is a small step from this to explaining complex events that gen-
erate ontological anxieties (illness, crop failure, unexpected death
of loved ones) by the intentional actions of a minimally counter-
intuitive agent – a supernatural agent. Selective pressure associated
with “hyperactive” agency detection might explain the prevalence
of counter-intuitive religious concepts that involve supernatural
agency relative to those that do not. Such concepts express the
abdication of an individual’s own agency (or an awareness of one’s
own lack of agency) regarding ontologically important events and
activities.
Religions also ascribe particular psychological qualities to
supernatural agents (Boyer, 2001). Put simply, gods punish and
beneﬁt believers according to the degree of their adherence to
doctrine (see also Barrett, 2004). They are not understood as
omniscient or as “full access agents” regarding adherents’ men-
tal states and experiences, irrespective of the prescriptions of
formal theology (Barrett and Keil, 1996). Instead, they are “strate-
gic access agents”: they are omniscient regarding only adherents’
beliefs, desires, and intentions regarding morally relevant actions
that affect their group. Group members follow the god’s prescrip-
tions for punishing dissent and praising assent, in the service of
sacred values (Atran, 2002). Being a member of such a group
thereby involves the minimally counter-intuitive representation
of a supernatural agent who polices the group’s moral boundaries,
supporting co-operation, altruism and other prosocial behavior
regarding the ingroup. This explains why other peoples’ religious
beliefs should matter to us – they justify sharing resources with
other believers, withholding resources from non-believers, pun-
ishingdefectors, and themore general intra-group and inter-group
dynamics widely studied in social psychology. If outgroups or
events challenge the ingroup’s sacred values, it experiences an
intense sense of threat since these are precisely the values that
ground ingroup identity and cement its connection to the deity.
The more inter-group conﬂict affects sacred values, the more
intractable that conﬂict becomes (Atran and Ginges, 2012).
Demarcation along religious lines facilitates thinking about
groups in essentialist terms (e.g., Hirschfeld, 1996; Gelman and
Hirschfeld, 1999; Haslam et al., 2000; Gil-White, 2001; Gelman,
2005). Religious groups often construe members as “ﬁctive kin”
(e.g., fellow believers as “brothers” or “brethren”). This supports
extending altruism to ﬁctive kin, treating threats to ﬁctive kin as
if they were threats to genetic kin, and supports the essentializa-
tion of religious group demarcations. Essentialism suggests that
beneath surface qualities there are deep qualities that confer group
membership. People may represent empty “place holders” for the
essences: they believe there is an essence without knowing pre-
cisely what it is. As with the “quoted” representations discussed
above, adherents may defer to authority to obtain information
about the essence or to obtain “permission” to cease searching for
it (see Medin and Ortony, 1989). Essentialized group differences
are therefore resistant to counter-examples: they can be accom-
modated because the representation is just a place holder. The
qualities that “ﬁll” the place holder can change, thus preserving
the essentialist structure of explaining surface differences by deep
differences.
Counter-intuitive representations get stickier by being embed-
ded in broader narratives. Norenzayan et al. (2006) found that
narratives including mostly intuitive representations, but one
or two minimally counter-intuitive representations, were more
likely to be recalled after a delay than narratives comprising
wholly intuitive representations or ones which were maximally
counter-intuitive. Such a structure is also found in culturally sta-
ble narratives like fairy tales. It is thus the interplay of intuition
and counter-intuition, natural and supernatural, that makes reli-
gious representations cognitively attractive, and contributes to
their stickiness (see also Barrett and Nyhof, 2001).
But religions are not only concerned with essentialized groups
and supernatural agents. They also involve rituals; indeed,
believed representations and rituals are mutually reinforcing
(e.g., McCauley and Lawson, 2002: Whitehouse, 2004). Ritual
provides affective or emotional validation for beliefs not other-
wise amenable to empirical veriﬁcation. Performing the ritual
provides adherents with the conviction that those beliefs are
validated (Franks, 2004; Bloch, 2005). Religious rituals vary in
their nature (Whitehouse, 2004), from the more intensely emo-
tional and “imagistic” (like baptism or funeral) to the more
“intellectual” and “doctrinal” (like repeating catechism). Reli-
gious rituals manage ontological anxiety in daily life via social
activities performed by ingroup members, drawing on speciﬁc
intra-group and inter-group hopes and fears, threats and other
dynamics (Atran, 2002). Moreover, repetition embeds the rit-
ual in the group’s norms, making it more central to the group’s
beliefs (Barrett and Lawson, 2001). In this way, ritual acts sig-
nal historical continuity of group membership, linking current
adherents to those of the past and recapitulating past inter-
group relations. By performing rituals accurately, and by engaging
in appropriate intra-group co-operation and punishment and
inter-group competition and derogation, diffuse ontological anx-
ieties are translated into concrete fears managed by particular
actions.
Other insights on how religious beliefs vary come from sociol-
ogy of religion. One way they vary (besides speciﬁc contents of the
beliefs), is in their enactment – the extent of involvement in activ-
ities beyond private belief. In economically developed nations, a
functional, “secular” religiosity has emerged as a redirected focus
for religious thinking (Luckmann, 1990) where many people have
ceased to adhere to traditional religions. Such “New Age” beliefs
express a form of religious “bricolage” or “do it yourself,” where
the individual selects congenial elements from different religions
(Luckmann, 1979). Berger (1967) and Beyer (1990) refers to this
as a privatization of religion, “repackaged” for individual con-
sumption. Such a pattern may dilute the intrinsic connection
between religious belief and shared ritual mentioned above. In
a related vein, Stark and Bainbridge (1987) noted three types
of activity, which they call “cult” involvement. An audience cult
is the most private form of adherence, and involves interest in
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religion, but perhaps only reading the occasional book or listen-
ing to the occasional lecture. A client cult involves contact with
other practitioners, but may only involve learning speciﬁc tech-
niques (e.g., completing a meditation course) as opposed to an
ongoing commitment. Finally, a cult movement involves conver-
sion accompanied by regular involvement in a religious lifestyle.
Of course, even this is not the most intense form of commitment.
Still others may go beyond “cult movement” to adopt speciﬁc per-
spectives on the religion, e.g., by special additional training, ritual
involvement, and authority sanctioning to become a privileged
member of the group (e.g., a priest).
A further step in religious involvement is engaging in funda-
mentalist beliefs and associated practices. The religious ingroup is
seen as engaged in a battle in response to a crisis – a cosmic war
between forces of good and evil. According to Marty and Appleby
(1994, 2004), fundamentalism involves a sense of conﬂict with
“enemies” from within, who departed from the original path, and
from without, whose secularist beliefs and policies are inimical to
religion itself, so that the religion is in danger of annihilation.
APPLICATION TO CTs
Our suggestion is that CTs are analogous to religious beliefs. There
may be variations in how each CT expresses quasi-religiousness.
Our suggestion is not that CTs possess more or fewer quasi-
religious qualities, but that all signiﬁcant CTs possess quasi-
religious qualities, each to varying degrees. That is, we are not
claiming that some CTs have minimally counter-intuitive repre-
sentations, and others do not; rather, we claim that they all do,
but that they vary in complexity and depth of such qualities. An
“ideal type” of a CT may possess all of the quasi-religious quali-
ties to a signiﬁcant degree of complexity and depth, whilst speciﬁc
instances diverge in different ways. Any dis-analogy may itself be
informative – just as we can ask why some CTs do not engender
strong social movements, we might also ask why some CTs gen-
erate the fervor of strongly held religious beliefs, whilst others do
not. We now articulate the main aspects of this ideal type as a set
of empirically tractable propositions.
Our overarching suggestion is that CTs draw on resources
employed by religious representations. CTs thus merge the intu-
itive and the counter-intuitive in response to challenging secular
events. Events are construed as resulting from the actions of an
outgroup that threatens values sacred to ingroup. This leads us to
Proposition 1 with three components.
Proposition 1: CT success or “stickiness” is a function of minimal
counter-intuitiveness
Proposition 1a: conspiring agents in successful CTs are repre-
sented as minimally counter-intuitive in strategic omniscience
and strategic omnipotence. Characterizing the conspiring agent
as possessing minimally counter-intuitive powers and knowledge
seems a core quality of CTs (Shermer, 2012). The agent is rarely
outlandishly or bizarrely powerful or strange, except in extreme
cases. Such cases function as rhetorical devices to deliberately con-
trast with, and so render more credible, the less bizarre qualities
of agents in other CTs by the same sponsors. For example, viewing
conspirators as“alien lizards”seems so outlandish as tomake other,
more obviously minimally counter-intuitive CTs about corpo-
rate ﬁnance seem more intuitive. Identifying conspirators as alien
lizards involves precisely the kind of not fully understood“quoted”
mystery, as in speciﬁc religious dogmas such as the Trinity or
Catholic transubstantiation. Moreover, the structure of apparently
contradictory religious beliefs that in quotes is consistent with the
ﬁnding that people simultaneously adhere to two contradictory
CTs about the same focus (that Princess Diana was assassinated
and that she staged her own death: Wood et al., 2012). Such a
pattern suggest a “monological” conspiracy-related belief system
that applies to more than one focus or topic (e.g., Swami et al.,
2011). We suggest further that it has speciﬁcally quasi-religious
qualities.
Often, however, agents are not viewed as maximally bizarre.
They possess supernatural qualities of omniscience or omnipo-
tence relative to the focus of the conspiracy, but not relative to other
domains of knowledge or action – they are minimally counter-
intuitive and minimally supernatural. For example, recurrent CTs
regarding Jews have alleged their omniscience and omnipotence
regarding medicine, astrology or alchemy in the Middle Ages
(Zukier, 1987), or ﬁnance in the modern era. In such cases, the
conspiring group is understood as all-knowing about the domain
of action, but also as all-seeing regarding the sponsor’s knowledge
about that domain. It is precisely this view of the conspirators as
a strategic agent that supports the power of the CT. The agent
group not only knows about the domain in question, but also
knows what the sponsors know about the domain, and can there-
fore limit the sponsor group’s (or any other victim’s) scope for
successful evasive action. Thus, adhering to such CTs abdicates
self-agency. This strategic access is a recurrent theme in CTs. In
the past, it might have been allied to supernatural ideas about the
agents (e.g., Jews as in league with the devil, or as having magic
powers; Zukier, 1987); in modern times it connects to the use of
surveillance technology (e.g., as used by government agencies).
When referring to“supernatural”qualities, we donotmean that
they are supernatural in the sense of being associated with non-
existent beings; rather, we suggest that theCT represents the agents
as having minimally counter-intuitive strategically omniscient and
omnipotent qualities beyond the human norm. “Strategic” in this
context implies that they are omnipotent and omniscience only
relative to the particular domain that constitutes the focus of the
conspiracy. Omnipotence supports their ability to carry out the
conspiracy (they know about the domain so they can act to fur-
ther their aims); omniscience allows them to be undiscovered or,
if discovered, to remain unchallenged (they know what others (do
not) know). It is this sense of supernatural that we intend, and
not that agents are god-like beings, though sometimes (as in the
Jewish CTs of the Middle Ages) such agents are recruited to the
explanation. More mundane conspiracies instantiate the broader
sense of the supernatural: for example, CTs regarding the assas-
sination of John F. Kennedy allude to hidden groups who were
able to carry out the murder and keep their role in it subsequently
undiscovered.
Proposition 1b: CTs are minimally counter-intuitive narratives.
Actions of conspirators are framed in minimally counter-intuitive
terms within minimally counter-intuitive narratives, which focus
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attention while remaining plausible explanations for threatening
experiences. The narrative explains the conspiracy using accounts
of everyday experiences and their connections to wider social con-
ditions – everyday schemas, scripts, and stories that are used
to explain other, non-conspiracy events are recruited in the CT
explanation, to which they form the intuitive background. The
CT propagators themselves can then offer minimally counter-
intuitive narratives for awareness that promise redemption from
the control of the conspirator. For example, the British conspir-
acy entrepreneur David Icke is “exposing the dream world we
believe to be real” and exhorts people that it is “time to wake up”
(http://www.davidicke.com/). Icke’s narrative for action is that the
wider population needs to become aware not only of the conspir-
acy against them, but also of their own hidden counter-intuitive
agency that can challenge that conspiracy. The exaggerated agency
of the conspirators can only be addressed by exaggerated agency
of those conspired against. (Icke, 2013).
Proposition 1c: CTs draw on culturally available images or
essentialized inter-group differences in developing the minimally
counter-intuitive narrative. Conspiracy theories draw on his-
torical patterns of inter-group relations and representations. The
role of essentialist characterizations may vary, but where CTs con-
nect to historical inter-group hostility and prejudice, they inherit
the essentialist structure of those inter-group relations – indeed,
CTs may be the “ammunition” of those inter-group hostilities.
Recurrent CTs depicting Jewish or Catholic agents exhibit such a
structure, even as the imputed essences have changed (exactly as
an essence placeholder would predict). The underlying qualities
that enable counter-intuitive access and control have changed over
time: where once they involved direct intercourse with a supernat-
ural agent (the devil, for example) that conferred speciﬁc powers,
now they involve exceptional intelligence, perhaps arising from
genetic inheritance, plus cunning and access to technology and
other resources. The structure of explaining conspiring activity by
reference to underlying, group-based essences remains – despite
changes in the alleged essences.
Proposition 2: Sharing CTs via communication rituals supports
management of anxiety by transforming unspeciﬁc anxieties into
focused fears
Communicating CTs is analogous to religious ritual – rehearsing
answers to shared questions, as a declaration of faith and group
identity (like the religiousCreed). Indeed such rituals forCTs often
take a reﬂexive form, providing not only answers to conspiracy-
related questions, but also anticipating critique and denigration
(e.g., Lewandowsky et al., 2013). Averting the denigration of the
ingroup, possibly by outgroup denigration, is then a recurrent
CT trope. Sharing core narrative cements sponsor ingroup iden-
tity and reinforces outgroup denigration; the general narrative of
redemption from the control of the conspirators offers a focus
for anxieties that threat generates. In this way, the vaguer threat
arising from the alleged action and counter-intuitive powers of the
conspiracy group is translated into focused fear and anger directed
at that group. The transmission of CTs in this way overlaps with
urban legends and rumors which also manage collective anxiety in
the face of uncertainty (Kay et al., 2009). In the past, face-to-face
communication in small communities would have provided fora
for this; modern CTs have a plethora of technologies available for
the same function. The internet, with blogs, chat rooms, and so on,
is a fecund ground for CTs to ﬂourish. This leads us to Proposition
3 with two components.
Proposition 3: CT narratives framed as conﬂicts over sacred values
are more successful
Proposition 3a: CTs framed as conﬂicts over sacred values are
longer lived and less open to empirical rebuttal. Construing
conspiring agents as a group committed to circumventing deeply
held cultural beliefs is analogous to religious inter-group con-
ﬂict over sacred values. As with the role of supernatural agents
in CTs, we suggest an analogy with religious sacred values, not a
homology. Many CTs concern the idea that a group is breaking
the law for their own advantage. The very notion of an omnipo-
tent, omniscient conspiracy group involves a denial of self-agency.
This threat to agency may be experienced as a serious reason for
outgroup derogation and conﬂict in cultures where the ideal of
individual autonomy and freedom are cherished as “sacred” (e.g.,
Western individualistic cultures). In other cases, conﬂict may arise
less over the alleged conspiracy per se than over the values and
beliefs that are threatened by the conspiracy. In the case of cor-
porations such as Monsanto, genetic modiﬁcation is taken as a
threat to the sanctity of life and reproduction, or as a threat to
natural ways of eating. In still other cases, conﬂict may arise less
over the domain of action for the conspiracy, but rather over the
cultural origin of the alleged conspiracy group. This is exempliﬁed
by the Jewish conspiracies noted above. Yet another case would
be the rejection by some Nigerian Muslim leaders of polio vac-
cines (Larson and Heymann, 2010) on the grounds that they form
part of a Western conspiracy, in which the vaccines are alleged
to threaten Muslim male fertility. In such cases, the conspiracy
group is seen to act in contradiction to values that are deeply
held – as sacred – by the sponsor group. A major outcome of
this would be a lack of trust and a reduction of the likelihood
of inter-group dialog and conciliation. Indeed, in conﬂicts over
sacred values, attempts by one side to gain concessions by offer-
ing some beneﬁt to the other (“buying them off”), may inﬂame
the conﬂict and increase tensions (Atran and Ginges, 2012). An
analogous pattern may arise in many ostensibly “secular” CTs: for
example, believers in a CT in which “Big Pharma” meddle with
Nature and human life could not be “bought off” by material
concessions.
Proposition 3b: CTs framed as conﬂicts over sacred values are
more likely to lead to intense commitment and action. Whether
a CT leads individuals to engage in collective action beyond an
audience or a client “cult” to a “movement cult” via proselytism or
fundamentalism depends on many factors. One is the interpreta-
tion of the conspiracy by adherents. If a conﬂict is understood
as concerning “sacred” values (Ginges and Atran, 2009; Atran
and Ginges, 2012), the CT provides a motivation and rationale
for action against the conspirators. Another factor relates to the
framing of other elements of the CT, the narrative, the agents
and actors. CTs that identify speciﬁc actors who engage in spe-
ciﬁc actions at identiﬁable locations and times afford concrete
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counter-conspiratorial action. As Atran and Norenzayan (2004)
has observed concerning the connection between “strong reli-
gion” and direct action (including terrorism), the causal drivers
of action may concern personality differences, but more impor-
tantly depend on group, inter-group and cultural facilitation and
direction. How believers interpret the threat and frame possible
courses of inter-group action are key. It is to these matters that we
now turn.
EXPLAINING CT BELIEF AND SPREAD: THE THEORY OF
SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS
Cognitive science approaches to religion explain the appeal of CT
beliefs by analyzing aspects of their content. CTs share many but
not all such features of organized religion, which led us to charac-
terize CTs as quasi-religious. Gervais and Henrich (2010) suggest
that such models of religion are insufﬁcient without an analysis
of cultural milieus. The milieus or groups to which people belong
predispose them to accept certain ideas more easily while rejecting
others, as they make sense of the events to which they are exposed.
These questions are addressed by social representations theory.
SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND “SPREAD”: COLLECTIVE SYMBOLIC
COPING WITH SUDDEN SOCIAL CHANGE
Social representations theory (Moscovici, 1961; Bauer andGaskell,
1999; Wagner and Hayes, 2005) investigates how laypersons make
sense of novel and threatening situations in everyday life. Its
premise is that modern societies are dominated by discourses
provided by experts (particularly scientists) whose authority is
not hegemonic (unlike Durkheim’s collective representations) but
competes with other sources like tradition. The transition from
collective representations in a hegemonic society to social repre-
sentations in a context of plural mentalities may be a condition for
the emergence of CTs in the ﬁrst place. Roberts (1972) explains
the historical emergence of CTs during the French revolution as
a desperate attempt to retain a collective representation of society
in the image of God and interpreted by the Church. Under a reli-
gious monopoly of interpretation, the revolution could only have
been the work of evil and its avatars (see the inﬂuential work of
Father Augustin de Barruel on the French Revolution as a Jacobin-
Freemason conspiracy in Roberts, 1972). Modern pluralism and
pragmatism might be a historical condition of both recognition
and proliferation of CTs.
Expert discourses (corresponding to domains of scientiﬁc
knowledge) are popularized and circulate via the mass media
where they are apprehended by laypersons who use them to
make individual and collective decisions. Examples include health-
related issues (e.g., dieting, cancer screening), consumer decision-
making (e.g., sustainability, fair trade, and ethical purchasing)
or the societal implications of new technologies (nuclear energy
in the 1970s and 1980s, biotechnology in the 1990s; Bauer, 1995).
Such situations confront laypersonswith unfamiliar knowledge, of
which they must develop a working understanding. Beck (1992)
and Giddens (1990) have characterized this condition as the “risk
society”: the negative repercussions of modern technologies are
uncontainable within national boundaries. Extensive research in
economics andpsychology has highlighted the differences between
expert and lay understandings of risk (Slovic et al., 1982; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1974). And communication scientists have stud-
ied how to best convey information about risk to the public, and
how to train the public to make proper use of it (Fischhoff, 1995).
Much of this research is based on the “deﬁcit model” of public
understanding of science (Wynne, 1991; Ziman, 1991) according
to which laypersons lack information or use biased cognition in
their decision-making.
The social representations approach investigates similar phe-
nomena, but rather than highlighting the deﬁcits of public
understanding, it focuses on the processes by which laypersons
reconstruct expert knowledge to enable social and pragmatic
functioning in everyday life. These processes translate the unfa-
miliar, abstract and often threatening aspects of expert knowledge
domains into familiar and mundane terms. They involve symbolic
resources from popular culture, religion, or group-speciﬁc ideolo-
gies. In this respect, a social representation is a hybrid creation
fusing popularized science knowledge and other forms of cultural
knowledge (Wagner, 2007). The function of a social representa-
tion, by making the unfamiliar familiar (Moscovici, 1984), is to
protect the symbolic integrity of a group’s worldview, a world-
view often threatened by expert discourse. Social representations
thus frame unfamiliar events in more familiar terms. (1974, p.
22) distinguished between two basic interpretive frames. Natural
frames “identify occurrences as seen as undirected, unoriented,
unanimated, unguided, “purely physical”. Social frames “provide
background understanding for events that incorporate the will,
aim and controlling effort of an intelligence, a live agency.” In these
terms, elaboration of social representations often entails replacing
a natural framing of events with a social framing.
There are two processes by which social representations are
elaborated: Anchoring and objectiﬁcation. Anchoring is naming
an unfamiliar object or event. By naming, an object is classi-
ﬁed and positioned in a familiar semantic ﬁeld which links it
to other things which it normally goes with or can be substi-
tuted by, and makes it distinct from opposites. Anchoring an
event makes it recognizable and less threatening, not least because
it can be discussed by members of the group. In Moscovici’s
(1961) study of the popularization of psychoanalysis, the abstract
domain of psychoanalysis was assimilated to the confession in
the Catholic press. This allowed Catholic laypersons to anchor a
key feature of psychoanalysis within their worldview and make
it less threatening. Objectiﬁcation is another way of dealing
with the unfamiliar, whereby abstract contents are made tangi-
ble through a metaphor or a concrete visual image. Examples of
objectiﬁcation include the everyday image of the atom as a ball
(Wagner and Hayes, 2005), the image of the couch as a symbol
of psychoanalysis (Moscovici, 1961), or the tendency to portray
microorganismsor genes as intentional agents (Wagner et al., 1995;
Bangerter,2000; Green andClémence,2008). In the termsoutlined
above, anchoring and objectiﬁcation transform the threatening
andmaximally counter-intuitive into the surprising butminimally
counter-intuitive. For example, the psychoanalyst is seen as having
the intuitive properties of a priest but with the minimally counter-
intuitive property of dealing with the unconscious rather than
the soul.
Anchoring and objectiﬁcation are two facets of the reconstruc-
tion of expert knowledge in common sense, a communicative
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process that is played out in the mass media, but also in conver-
sations between individuals (Moscovici, 1984). Similar to rumor,
this communication process is driven by the need to understand
and make sense of the unfamiliar object or event (Green and Clé-
mence,2008). Indeed, the intensitywithwhich a rumor spreads is a
joint function of an event’s importance and its ambiguity (Allport
and Postman, 1947; Rosnow, 1980; Franks and Attia, 2011).
Social representations theory has an additional facet that makes
it well-equipped to deal with lay thinking, especially relative to
CTs. Often, laypersons are confronted with unfamiliar techno-
scientiﬁc domains in an abrupt manner, as events emerge that
require attention, interpretation, and action. The elaboration of
a relevant social representation serves a process of collective sym-
bolic coping by which groups manage the implications of events
that propel social change (Wagner et al., 2002). Collective symbolic
coping is analogous to the process of individual coping in stress
research (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). Wagner et al. (2002) pro-
posed that collective symbolic coping proceeds according to four
stages: awareness, divergence, convergence, and normalization.
Awareness is when an event is made into an issue relevant for the
public by the media. Divergence is when public discourse about
the issue leads to the emergence of multiple frames or interpreta-
tions, creating a symbolic environment characterized by ambiguity
or uncertainty. Convergence is when a dominant frame emerges,
suppressing competing frames and decreasing uncertainty. Finally,
normalization corresponds to an incorporation of the event into
everyday knowledge. The event ceases to be threatening.
Wagner et al. (2002) illustrated collective symbolic coping with
the emergence of biotechnology in Europe during the 1990s. Dur-
ing the coping phases, the prevalence of beliefs in threatening
or fantastic images of biotechnology was higher than before or
after coping. Another example comes from the emergence of new
infectious diseases (e.g., Ebola virus, SARS, avian inﬂuenza, and
most recently, the 2009 H1N1 inﬂuenza, or“swine ﬂu”pandemic).
Expert discourses on disease risk have been propagated widely in
the media. But laypersons have difﬁculty interpreting these dis-
courses (framed in the abstract, probabilistic terms of risk science).
Collective symbolic coping with disease often entails the elabo-
ration of representations identifying a culprit, typically a group
responsible for the outbreak (Joffe, 1999).
APPLICATION TO CTs
In general, then, social representations constitute normatively
incorrect but functional knowledge structures elaborated by
laypersons on contact with expert knowledge. Social representa-
tions help groups to symbolically cope with a new or threatening
event, by making abstract risk concrete, often by focusing blame.
They thus contrast with expert knowledge, developing a subversive
character. These properties make the theory of social representa-
tions useful for understanding CTs: as above, we express this in a
series of empirically testable propositions.
Proposition 4: the spread of CTs operates via the processes of
anchoring and objectiﬁcation
An approach to CT spread using social representations has been
proposed by Byford (2002), who notes that CTs evidence a “ﬂuid
and dynamic quality” (Byford, 2002, p. 3.3), i.e., a wide variety
of forms, while at the same time sharing some characteristics.
In trying to pinpoint key structural features of CT narratives,
researchers have classiﬁed the agent groups to which the conspir-
acy is attributed, with some suggesting CTs stigmatize minorities
(Moscovici, 1987), and others that they frame events as thework of
“evil elites” (Campion-Vincent, 2005). Both kinds of CT exist and
their appeal depends on speciﬁc individual differences like ide-
ological preferences, for example (Wagner-Egger and Bangerter,
2007). Minority CTs identify stigmatized outgroups as scapegoats
for events, for example blaming Jews for the plague, Muslims for
plotting against Western societies, or Communists for plotting
to overthrow democracy. Evil elite CTs tend to focus on powerful
organizations that orchestrate events behind the scenes in a bid for
world domination, such as the Bilderberg Group. Both types con-
stitute general frames within which current events can be ﬂexibly
accommodated in a conspiratorial worldview, even to the point of
glossing over contradictions between alternative CTs (Wood et al.,
2012). This corresponds to the anchoring process by which com-
plex, abstract expert-dominated discourses about causes of events
get reinterpreted as a personiﬁed conspiracy. Telling examples of
objectiﬁcation are abundant in the CT genre, especially since their
mass media diffusion involves a strong visual component. Recur-
rent images associated with CTs include the all-seeing eye of the
Illuminati as an embodiment of omniscience, or depictions of rep-
tilian aliens or lizards at the heart of manyCTs, similar to the ﬁgure
of the devil, the original conspirator (Jacques-Chapin, 1987).
Proposition 5: CTs are devices to cope with collective trauma via
their development and spread as social representations
Traumatic collective events need to be assimilated by the groups
that experience them (Pennebaker et al., 1997). This often involves
constructing a cause, especially for seemingly random events, like
the car accident in which Princess Diana was killed. Ascribing
causality allows coping with the loss of control caused by the expe-
rience (Kay et al., 2009), according to the maxim that big events
(e.g., the death of a celebrity) call for big causes (a conspiracy;
McCauley and Jacques, 1979; Leman and Cinnirella, 2007). The
symbolic elaboration of a powerful, shadowy conspiring group
as cause of the event is a way to do justice to its emotional
importance.
Proposition 6: CTs’ rejection of authoritative discourses arises from
how expert knowledge gets reconstructed as a social
representation
Recall how collective symbolic coping progresses through stages of
awareness, divergence, convergence, and normalization. In these
terms, CT spread corresponds to a “denormalization” of a dom-
inant framing of an event: an account that problematizes that
frame, construing it as a sham and suggesting alternative truths.
Consider the example of AIDS, which has been in a process of
normalization since the 1990s (Rosenbrock et al., 2000): its image
has transformed from a deadly plague to a serious, but chronic and
manageable disease, and there is a consensus thatAIDS is caused by
the HIV virus. CTs about AIDS (e.g., propagated by AIDS denial-
ist movements, Kalichman, 2009), reject this cause, suggesting
that AIDS is caused by environmental or lifestyle factors. Militant
action is aimed at undermining the dominant framing of AIDS.
www.frontiersin.org July 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 424 | 7
“fpsyg-04-00424” — 2013/7/12 — 19:47 — page 8 — #8
Franks et al. Conspiracy theory as quasi-religion
Another aspect of this concerns the“choice”of outgroup,which
may depend both on the milieu of sense-making and on speciﬁc
individual differences and ideological preferences; right-wing pol-
itics may typically mobilize against minorities, whilst left-wing
politics incriminate powerful elites (Wagner-Egger and Bangerter,
2007). This also suggests that CTs are a likely risk of extremist
politics (Inglehart, 1987; Hogg and Blaylock, 2011).
EXPLAINING HOW CTs MOBILIZE COLLECTIVE ACTION:
FRAME THEORY
Many CTs constitute means of making sense of complex events
by ascribing them a clear cause, often focusing blame on a cul-
prit. The psychological and socio-cultural qualities of CTs can
mobilize resistance to powerful organizations, such as multina-
tional corporations or political tyranny. Alternatively, CTs may
generate a highly cynical form of inter-group engagement in civic
society, reducing trust, and driving strategic action which under-
mines the functioning of a modern public sphere (in the sense
of Habermas, 1981). This is where much of the public concern
about modern CTs arises, since they can create a climate of mis-
trust or lead to disengagement from mainstream society or from
ofﬁcially recommended practices. In the US, Blacks who believe
that AIDS is a White conspiracy against Blacks are less likely to
practice contraception, probably because of mistrust toward the
public health system (Thorburn and Bogart, 2005). In other cases,
CTs may be more widely believed and contribute to social and
political engagement (e.g., Sapountzis and Condor, 2013).
But not all CTs lead to collective mobilization. Activist groups
like AIDS denialists actively propagate beliefs about the scientiﬁc
establishment attempting to hide the truth aboutAIDS. But exam-
ples like these are rare. There are no sustainable social movements
dedicated to revealing the truth about Princess Diana’s demise, for
example, or to making the purportedly faked moon landings a
high-proﬁle public issue. Why do some CTs mobilize groups into
action while many others do not? Social representations theory
does not really focus on CTs’ potential for mobilization (Klein
and Licata, 2003); mobilization requires a blueprint for action in
addition to sense-making. Frame theory as applied to social move-
ments has speciﬁed the constitution of such blueprints, in a way
compatible with social representations theory.
FRAME THEORY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
A frame is a mechanism of selection, of inclusion and exclu-
sion of elements that shape our understanding of experience.
Goffman (1974, p. 21) called them “schemata of interpretation,”
and, as described above, distinguished two basic frames: natural
and social. In the social movement literature, framing is seen as an
alternative to structural explanations of collective action. Collec-
tive actiondoes not followautomatically from ideological bent, but
rather because individuals are emotionally aroused by issues and
attached to symbols worthy of their loyalty. Framing is the process
of construction of these issues or symbols by a social actor, who
has to gain from mobilization around the issue. Framing moves
groups into action, recruiting bystanders, while demotivating and
demobilizing antagonists (Tarrow,1994;Benford andSnow,2000).
Mass media frames name and solve a problem by providing
structures of cognition and interpretation: “To frame is to select
some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient
in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a partic-
ular problem deﬁnition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation,
and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Ent-
man,1993, p. 52). Frame elements are enhanced by a keymetaphor
and eye-catching visualizations (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989).
Importantly, framing collective action goes beyond interpretation
to cover three steps: diagnosis, prognosis, and motivation (Ben-
ford and Snow, 2000). Diagnosis involves identifying a problem
and attributing it to a cause, i.e., focusing blame on a target. Prog-
nosis involves “articulation of a proposed solution to the problem,
or at least a plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out
the plan” (Benford and Snow, 2000, p. 616). Motivation involves
constructing a rationale for action, for example by elaborating
discourses describing the severity or urgency of the issue framed.
Social representations theory and frame theory both focus ondiag-
nosis. However, social representations theory is less speciﬁc on
prognosis and motivation.
Framing for strategic action via prognosis and motivation may
initially be a shot in the dark where the conditions for success-
ful action are not clear. The effectiveness of a frame in garnering
support is its resonance (Benford and Snow, 2000). Frame reso-
nance is a function of its credibility and its salience. Credibility
is itself a function of the consistency of the frame, its empirical
credibility, and the credibility of the actors promoting the frame.
Salience is the degree to which the frame elements are impor-
tant to the intended targets. Moreover, a frame needs to cross the
divide between specialist channels and the mass media to succeed
in mobilization (Strodthoff et al., 1985).
Frames also have a temporal dimension in a culture; they come
and go. This is captured by research on issue-attention cycles. Start-
ing from the notion that the polity does not react to grievance per
se, but rather to mass mediation of grievance, Downs (1972) sug-
gested that news ebbs and ﬂows in ﬁve phases constituting an
issue-attention cycle: in the initial pre-problem stage, grievances
receive little public attention. Some dramatic event, e.g., an acci-
dent, triggers an alarmed discovery of grievance. The public takes
notice and develops a pressing sense that “something needs to be
done.” During a third phase, the costs of solving the problem
become clear, and the public becomes aware that the grievance
was beneﬁcial for some. After action, public attention is likely
to wane into a gradual decline (fourth phase); the news space
is taken over by other novel issues. Finally, post-problem the
issue moves into an unstable limbo. Some actor might monitor
the issue and keep its memory, so it can ﬂare up sporadically
and be kept from oblivion. Such issues cycles map the course of
mass media attention in a public arena where capacity is limited,
e.g., as when other issues compete for attention (Hilgartner and
Bosk, 1988).
APPLICATION TO CTs
By their nature, all CTs function as diagnostic frames. How-
ever, not all establish a prognosis (beyond vague calls to “wake
up”) and very few elaborate discourses calling for speciﬁc action
with regard to identiﬁed culprits. And to the extent that a
given CT frames its adherents as lacking relevant agency (and
the conspirators as strategically omnipotent), it is likely to
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engender precisely the kind of social and political disengage-
ment noted above. Our propositions below should be seen in this
context.
Proposition 7: CTs can generate collective action when their frames
are credible and salient
Some CTs motivate coordinated collective action for short periods
of time, often using channels of communication and action that
are outside the norm. This is often the case for fringe political
movements (Inglehart, 1987). The Occupy movements of 2011–
2012 were successful in mobilizing action for a short time because
of an intuitive diagnosis (“Wall Street” as a symbol of evil ﬁnance
and the culprit for the latest ﬁnancial crisis), prognosis, and moti-
vation, by specifying a concrete course of action (“occupy”), and
by a claim of salience and credibility relevant to many constituen-
cies of the public, which connected the action to deeply held values
of democracy and fairness (“We are the 99 percent”). At the other
end of the political spectrum, the right-wing US Tea Party attracts
anxiety-driven adherents of CTs about government (Barreto et al.,
2011).
What makes a CT frame credible or salient? As noted above
regarding the quasi-religious content of CT beliefs, the change
from a client- or audience-cult approach to a CT, to involvement
in a cult-movement and onto further committed practical action
seems to involve framingwith speciﬁc contents, targets or locations
for counter-conspiracy action. A speciﬁc driver for action may
also be the extent to which a conspiracy is framed as contradicting
sacred values.
The success of such framing may depend on the credibility of
those who frame communications to the group or who lead the
group (e.g., Turner and Killian, 1957; Reicher, 1987). If opinion
leaders regarding the CT are credible, their framing of the conspir-
acy as a normative clash over sacredor deeply held valuesmaybe an
important spur to action. Framing also offers a way of interpreting
the ﬁndings of Sapountzis and Condor (2013) regarding CTs in
Greek citizens’ discussions of the Macedonian crisis. They found
thatCTs echoedpast and future threats toGreece (thus establishing
credibility via tradition and future projects) and also transmuted
the understanding of inter-group threats from being concerned
with symbolic competition to include realistic competition (estab-
lishing salience and relevance). Mobilizing a CT to challenge the
established inter-group frame of reference – to denormalize that
frame, as in Proposition 6 above – provides fertile conditions for
collective political action. Indeed, some CTs may motivate action
by taking a relatively vague, existential anxiety, translating it into
a symbolic inter-group threat, and then transmuting this into a
more speciﬁc realistic conﬂict over resources – where the latter
gives tangible grounds and focus for action.
However, many CTs fail to engender action. Some that are
widely held, like JFK assassination CTs, fail to relate the diagnosis
to aprognosis andmotivation–perhaps becausenoobvious action
is relevant. OtherCTsmay fail tomobilize collective action because
they lack sufﬁcient resonance – credibility or salience. For example,
that white US college students are less likely to believe in CTs
depicting the US government as conspiring against Blacks than
Black students are (Crocker et al., 1999) may reﬂect insufﬁcient
frame salience.
Proposition 8: CTs ﬂuctuate in their cultural success as a result of
issue-attention cycles
Issue-attention cycles illustrate some of the difﬁculties evidenced
by CTs in eliciting sustained mainstream attention. Consider
the so-called “satanism ritual abuse movement.” Various inter-
est groups in the US in the 1980s (religious groups, therapists,
politicians, and other public ofﬁcials) and mass media propagated
stories of satanic cult activity. Allegedly, such cults were engag-
ing in conspiratorial activities designed to undermine Christianity
and civil society, including kidnapping and blood sacriﬁce ritu-
als (Richardson et al., 1991). Rumors of cult activities captured
the attention of the US public with a moderate degree of inten-
sity for several years. The mainstream success of this CT can be
explained by several factors from frame theory; the spillover into
the mass media, the construal of Satanism as undermining sacred
values of contemporary US society, and the enrollment of credible
specialists to convey such ideas. However, such a conﬁguration
of interested parties was not sustainable in the absence of real
evidence and attention waned in the 1990s.
CONCLUSION
Conspiracy theories are a feature of common sense. We have
suggested that they involve quasi-religious explanations of threat-
ening events. In that sense CTs express the coexistence of “older”
and ”newer” mentalities. The quasi-religious hypothesis aims to
elucidate the dynamics of CTs and thereby address the three key
questions that arise regarding the distribution of representations
and their connection to social movements: the questions of “stick,”
“spread,” and “action.”
THE QUASI-RELIGIOUS HYPOTHESIS
Our main hypothesis regarding what makes CTs “stick” to
explain threats, is that they incorporate quasi-religious, mini-
mally counter-intuitive representations of external agents who are
omniscient and omnipotent regarding the domain of that threat.
Ascribing supernormal agency to the conspirators connects the
conspiracy to historical inter-group relations and conﬂicts, so that
the social groups involved are also represented in hard-to-falsify
essentialist terms, which naturalize the differences and explana-
tion. These elements of religious thinking are recruited for a
ﬂexible, pragmatic, and secular explanation. Such representations
of conspirators also contribute to the psychological anxiety man-
aging function of CTs: translating diffuse anxiety about a threat
into speciﬁc, historically recurrent fears and inter-groupdynamics.
The main hypothesis regarding CT’s spread is that social repre-
sentations anchor threatening events in terms of already familiar
understandings, and objectify them in concrete terms. CTs are
rooted in long-established contents and patterns of thinking. This
suggests that widespreadCTs should typically involve easily identi-
ﬁed outgroups, either in stigmatized minorities or powerful elites
whose agency is implicated and exaggerated.
To the extent that CTs frame events credibly and speciﬁcally
enough to direct action, and in strong evaluative terms (e.g.,
regarding conﬂicts over sacred values), they may lead to counter-
conspiratorial social action. However, the way CTs bracket the
agency of the ingroup and emphasize the agency of the all-
powerful outgroup can foster disempowerment, inaction on the
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part of CT believers or a call to opt out of society. Transmut-
ing inaction into counter-conspiracy action therefore requires
quite speciﬁc additional cultural and inter-group inﬂuences to
be brought to bear. These involve empirical credibility and social
prestige of CT sponsors, and opinion formers.
THE QUASI-RELIGIOUS HYPOTHESIS AND OTHER APPROACHES
Insofar as our account emphasizes overinterpreted agency as a
means of managing collective anxiety, the quasi-religious hypoth-
esis overlaps with other accounts of CTs. Other accounts argue
for the centrality of ideology, discourse or political beliefs in CTs’
anxiety management (e.g., Hogg and Blaylock, 2011; Van Prooi-
jen, 2011), or for agency issues per se in CTs (e.g., Shermer, 2012;
Swami and Furnham, 2012), without adverting to religion. Such
accounts are powerful and illuminating.
However, our suggestion is that analogies between CTs and
religion have speciﬁc implications beyond those from ideology
or from agency. One such implication is the intrinsic indeter-
minacy in quasi-religious framings (the kernel of doubt in the
structure of quoted beliefs). We suggest that CTs draw on beliefs
that are not fully understood or interpreted, where the details
of the conspiracy are not usually fully spelled out. Other views
stress the role of CTs in responding to uncertainty; we suggest that
the quasi-religious response itself incorporates uncertainty and
indeterminacy. Such indeterminacy underpins the quasi-religious
view, and supports the 13 speciﬁc propositions that we have artic-
ulated. Other empirical consequences follow from the hypothesis
– for example, that the indeterminacy generated by the kernel of
doubt generates resistance to counter-examples and falsiﬁcation;
or that established CTs offer scope for schism and intra-group
division as do religious beliefs. There is similar speciﬁcity to the
empirical implications of the ways in which social representations
theory addresses sense-making, via anchoring and objectiﬁcation;
and to the ways in which framing connects to collective action.
Put another way, we concur with accounts explaining CTs rel-
ative to ideology and culture or agency, but suggest that CTs have
an array of speciﬁc quasi-religious qualities that are complemen-
tary to, and instantiate, those accounts in particular ways that
draw on the dynamics of social representations and frame theory.
We suggest that the religious analogy can be a fertile, while more
constrained, empirical approach.
CTs, QUASI-RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, AND CIVIL SOCIETY
The elements of stick, spread, and action, whilst analytically sep-
arable, are not separate sequences of CTs. Indeed, their overlap
leads to the prediction that CT spread is not simply a repeti-
tion and sharing of a “ﬁnished” representation; rather, as the CT
spreads it is elaborated and embedded into social representations
that may frame collective action. A particular path of this is the
progressive normalization of the CT, involving the essentializa-
tion of outgroups and theirminimally counter-intuitive capacities.
Once a CT is normalized it becomes an incontrovertible, taken-
for-granted part of commonsense. The CT narrative can then
function as an interpretive template for other threats. Conspir-
atorial thinking is therefore mutable and portable across threats
and domains.
The quasi-religious account thus offers a way of interpreting
the paradoxical relations between CTs and modern civil soci-
ety. On the one hand, cultural conditions of pluralism and
secularism are preconditions for the “bricolage” that engenders
a CT. But on the other hand, speciﬁc CTs may attempt to
counter such pluralism, by denigrating outgroups that might
have power similar to or greater than the ingroup (for example
in recurrent anti-Jewish CTs). Moreover, CTs offer an “oppor-
tunity” for civil society, in supporting the emergence of issue-
based social movements that underpin much social change; in
this sense CTs can challenge established economic and politi-
cal disparities. But, CTs also threaten civil society, since such
quasi-religious ways of thinking engenders uncompromising fun-
damentalism that decrease the prospects of fruitful inter-group
dialog. CTs undermine civil society when they mobilize for exit
rather than voice, or by framing violent actions against identi-
ﬁed targets, be they powerful actors or stigmatized minorities.
Hence, as religious beliefs, CTs do not necessarily threaten civil
society.
Our proposal has implications for future research. Investigating
our propositions means exploring the cultural, social, and cog-
nitive psychological processes that connect “stick,” “spread,” and
“action.” In this way, we can gauge how a CT becomes a threat or
an opportunity for civil society. Determining how andwhy speciﬁc
CTs become threats whilst others offer opportunities will require
a case-by-case comparative approach which integrates individual,
social, and cultural levels of analysis, and examines the speciﬁc
contents of a CT, its inter-group milieu, and its cultural transmis-
sion processes and contexts. It would be too risky to dismiss a
priori the dynamics involved in CTs as socially dysfunctional. In
this paper we have rather assumed that dysfunction is a secondary
development of what is primarily a functional feature of social life,
i.e., the commonsense attribution of agency to explain threats and
dangerous events.
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